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Abstract 
We evaluate and compare the long-term economic effects of three cordon-based road pricing 
schemes applied to the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. To conduct this analysis, we employ a 
spatially disaggregated general equilibrium model of a regional economy that incorporates the decisions 
of residents, firms, and developers, integrated with a spatially disaggregated strategic transportation 
planning model that features mode, time period, and route choice. 
We find that all cordon pricing schemes increase welfare of the residents, as well as lead to GDP 
growth. At the optimum, the larger cordon and a double cordon lead to higher benefits than the small 
cordon encompassing downtown core. Nevertheless, the small cordon seems to be a safer bet because 
when the toll charge is set suboptimally, the net benefits from the small cordon compared to the optimum 
change negligibly, while the net benefits from the larger cordon decline sharply as the charge deviates 
from the optimal level. 
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Long-Term Consequences of Congestion Pricing: A Small Cordon in 
the Hand Is Worth Two in the Bush 
Elena Safirova, Sébastien Houde, Conrad Coleman, Winston Harrington,  
and D. Abram Lipman∗
Introduction 
The theory of road pricing goes back to Pigou (1920) and both ideas and practice have 
seen rapid recent developments (Small and Gómez-Ibáñez 1998; Lindsey and Verhoef 2001; 
Transportation Research Board 2003). While the first-best tolls are straightforward to derive for 
the simple theoretical cases, in real life there are significant complications, such as the 
availability of tolling technology, the heterogeneity of economic agents, and the interactions 
between the transportation sector and the rest of the economy.  
Among the available second-best policies, cordon tolls have been widely studied (May, 
Liu, Shepherd, and Sumalee 2002; Shepherd and Sumalee 2004; Mun, Konishi, and Yoshikawa 
2003; Zhang and Yang 2003). In a cordon toll scheme, travelers who want to drive into the 
charged area have to pay a toll that is levied at specific points of the road network located on the 
cordon. Cordon tolls provide a few advantages over other types of road pricing: they are 
transparent and easy to understand, they are relatively easy to implement, and the technology has 
been tested and is widely available. At the same time, cordon tolls have been criticized for being 
inflexible (the tolling locations cannot be easily changed), for being inefficient (because short 
and long trips that contribute differently to congestion are charged at the same rate), for causing 
increased congestion just outside the cordon, and for adversely affecting economic activity 
within the boundary. Although even single cordons have been demonstrated to perform close to 
first-best optima in simple theoretical models (Verhoef 2002; Akiyama, Mun, and Okushima 
2002; Santos 2004), their remaining inefficiencies can be rectified further by the use of more 
complicated schemes, such as multiple cordons or cordons with fees varying by the time of day 
and direction.  
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Several theoretical studies describe optimal cordon locations in additional to optimal 
cordon charges. In real cities, however, possible cordon locations are limited by network 
structure and other features of metropolitan organization. In practice, therefore, it is likely that 
the choice of the cordon will be highly discrete, allowing for a very limited number of locations. 
Nevertheless, it is desirable to compare the welfare and distributional effects of different policies 
to see the nature of trade-offs involved. 
Economic evaluations of congestion pricing in general, and for London in particular, 
have predicted these schemes would be successful. These predictions, however, have been based 
on the evaluation of transportation effects alone; the wider economic effects of such schemes 
have remained uncertain (Vickerman 2005), as tolls will affect travelers’ budget constraints and 
result not only in mode switching but also in broader changes in the economy that will be 
accompanied by the geographic redistribution of trips. Concerns that the London cordon may 
have negative effects on the economy of the central area, particularly on retail, have caused a 
reduction of the tolling window in response to complaints of retailers (Santos and Shaffer 2004). 
At present, the city of London is considering expanding the licensing area, and this measure is 
likely to result in higher toll collection. Very little is known, however, about the future effects of 
the cordon expansion on the city’s businesses and residents.  
In this paper, we model and compare the long-term effects of three cordon-based policies: 
a Downtown cordon (a small, London-type cordon encompassing the core downtown area); a 
large Beltway cordon (the boundary of which coincides with the “Beltway,” Washington, DC’s 
ring road); and a Double cordon (where Downtown and Beltway cordons are implemented 
simultaneously). Safirova et al. (2005) have addressed the question of cordon toll location using 
a transportation model calibrated to the Washington, DC, metropolitan region (the Washington-
START model). They concluded that a cordon surrounding the downtown core of Washington, 
DC, would bring welfare gains similar to those of a much larger Beltway cordon. However, they 
found that the distributional effects of the two cordons are quite different and highly tied to the 
redistribution scheme employed.   
This paper revisits the comparison of these two cordons for the Washington, DC, region 
and considers a third policy where the two cordons are implemented simultaneously. In this 
paper, however, comparisons are made using LUSTRE, an integrated model of Washington-
START, and a land-use and economic model (RELU). Our motivation is to investigate how the 
long-term economic and land use effects vary with the location of the cordon tolls.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe the 
LUSTRE model, its components, the method of model integration, and the welfare measures 
used in this study. Section three outlines the policies we simulate in this paper in a more precise 
manner. Section four reports on the results, including geographical distribution of the welfare 
gains under the three policies. The last section concludes and lays out a future agenda.      
LUSTRE Model Overview 
The LUSTRE model is an integrated model of land use, economic activity, and 
transportation. The model combines two pre-existing models: the Regional Economy and Land 
Use (RELU) model and the Strategic and Regional Transport (START) modeling suite.  
The RELU model was developed by Alex Anas and Elena Safirova with the purpose of 
creating a theoretically sound modeling tool for the analysis of interactions between 
transportation, land use, and economic activity. The model is meant to be integrated with a 
detailed transportation model. The START modeling suite was developed by MVA Consultancy 
(May, Roberts, and Mason 1992). More recently, this model was calibrated for the Washington, 
DC, metropolitan area (referred to as Washington START) and used to conduct a wide range of 
policy simulations. LUSTRE is calibrated for the Washington, DC, metropolitan region for the 
year 2000; the transportation network and characteristics of the economy both are specific to this 
region. 
RELU Description 
RELU is a spatially disaggregated static computable general equilibrium model that 
represents the long-term economic equilibrium in a regional economy. For this paper, the spatial 
representation corresponds to the Washington, DC, metropolitan area divided in 36 economic 
zones, plus four outer zones that act as sinks (i.e., they attract economic activity but are not 
equilibrated together with the model zones). RELU follows the structure of Anas and Xu (1999) 
in its modeling philosophy, although several new features have been added. For an exposition of 
the model in greater detail, we refer the reader to Safirova et al. (2006). The following presents 
the salient features of the model. 
RELU has seven types of economic agents that are explicitly represented. There are four 
types of individuals that correspond to a given skill level. These individuals are the consumers 
and the workforce in the regional economy; their total number is held fixed across simulations. 
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The three other agent types are producers, landlords, and developers. Although the government is 
not explicitly modeled, income and property taxes are present.  
Individuals maximize their utility based on a series of discrete and continuous choices. 
After deciding whether to work or to be unemployed, individuals choose a triple corresponding 
to their residence, workplace, and type of housing. Conditional on these discrete choices, 
individuals decide how much housing to rent and how much retail goods and services to 
purchase at each available retail location. The costs of traveling to a given work or shopping 
destination are taken into account. Although leisure is not represented in the model, aggregate 
labor supply is elastic because of voluntary unemployment and the variation in time spent 
traveling to shop.  
The production sector consists of four basic industries: agriculture, manufacturing, 
business services, and retail; construction/demolition industries are represented as well. The 
producers are perfectly competitive profit-maximizing agents, with a Cobb-Douglas production 
function between four groups of inputs: labor, capital, buildings, and intermediate inputs. At the 
same time, within input groups, substitution is characterized by a constant elasticity of 
substitution function. All primary industries, except retail, provide intermediate inputs to other 
sectors. Retail output is consumed by individuals only or exported out of the economic region. 
Prices of intermediate inputs include freight costs; hence, firm reallocation is affected by the cost 
of shipping goods. 
Landlords manage floor space in a profit-maximizing way in a perfectly competitive 
market. Rents and operating costs are taken as given. Landlords decide whether or not to offer a 
unit amount of floor space on the rental market. Floor space in buildings is disaggregated into 
four types: single family housing, multi-family housing, commercial, and industrial use. 
Developers, like landlords, are profit-maximizing agents. They determine how much 
vacant land should be converted into buildings or vice versa. Construction and demolition prices 
and other costs are taken as given. Potential rents for the building also affect developers’ 
decisions. Each individual owns a certain share of the real estate. 
Washington START Description 
START contains two sub-models referred to as the supply-side and the demand-side. The 
supply-side consists of the transportation network disaggregated in 40 travel zones (START’s 
travel zones correspond to RELU’s economic zones, 36 + 4). Each zone has three stylized 
transportation links (inbound, outbound, and circumferential) and a number of other “special” 
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links that represent the principal highway segments and bridges of the region. The traffic quality 
for each link is characterized by a speed-flow curve. The rail network of the region combines the 
Washington Metrorail system and suburban heavy rail systems (Maryland Rail Commuter 
[MARC] and Virginia Railway Express [VRE]). The three rail systems are modeled. Bus travel 
is represented by a highly stylized route network, with bus accessibility in any zone determined 
by the density of stops, frequency of service, and reported bus travel times. Transit crowding 
costs and parking search costs are explicitly included in the model. The model also accounts for 
existing high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes. The supply-side computes the generalized cost of 
travel taking into account the time and monetary elements of traveling. Time elements include 
the time spent traveling, transit waiting time, parking search time, and transit crowding penalties. 
Monetary elements include car operating costs, car depreciation costs, tolls, and transit fares. The 
value of time is a function of the travelers’ wage rate and varies by trip purpose.  
The demand-side is a strategic model with a nested logit structure. In START, trip 
purposes and origins are taken as given. Agents choose whether or not to generate a trip, 
destination, mode, time of day, and route (in LUSTRE, trip generation and destination is 
delegated to RELU). Nest order may be interchanged for different purposes. The model 
distinguishes four travel modes: single occupancy vehicle (SOV), HOV, transit (which has two 
sub-modes: bus and rail), and non-motorized (walk and bike). It also represents three time 
periods: morning peak, afternoon peak, and off-peak. Travelers maximize their utility of travel 
based on a generalized cost of travel that combines time and money costs explicitly modeled in 
the supply module, as well as idiosyncratic preferences.  
The overall structure of START is iterative. The trips computed in the demand-side are 
loaded in to the supply-side network. The supply-side uses the loads to compute costs of travel, 
which are passed back to the demand module. This process iterates until the costs of travel 
converge to equilibrium values. 
Model Integration 
Figure 1 summarizes RELU and START and the integration procedure. First, RELU 
takes the time and monetary costs of travel as given. The RELU simulation yields (in addition to 
other land use and economic effects) trip demands, disaggregated by purpose and 
origin/destination pair, and wage rates. Trips are loaded into START and RELU-determined 
wage rates translate into value of time for START. Thereafter, START computes the generalized 
costs of travel. Any transportation policies are taken into account in this step. Computed 
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generalized costs are sent back to RELU. This iterative process between the two models 
continues until trip demands and costs converge. 
Welfare 
The strength of LUSTRE resides in its ability to compute welfare measures that account 
for the changes in transportation as economic variables. LUSTRE’s welfare measures are 
provided by RELU based on utility function for individuals. Since RELU’s indirect utility 
function is a function of endogenous economic and transportation variables, we can decompose 
the welfare change to evaluate how each of those variables affects the welfare. The 
decomposition of the welfare gains is approximated using the first-order Taylor polynomial for 
the welfare measure (i.e., the sum of the partial derivatives of the welfare function, times the 
variation, from the baseline to the simulation, of the endogenous economic and transportation 
variables). Following this approach, we get the following formulation for the decomposition of 
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In equation (1), the first term represents welfare gains from the changes in toll revenues 
redistributed (TRD) (surplus of transit fares is included); the second term accounts for changes 
in real estate value (RE); the third term stands for changes in wages ( ); the fourth term 
accounts for changes in retail prices ( ); the fifth term comes from the changes in rents (
w
z pℜ R); 
the sixth term represents changes in commuting costs ( ); the seventh term stands for 
changes in costs of shopping trips ( ) and the last term is a correction term (
working G
shopping G φ ) due the 
first-order approximation. 
Policy Formulation 
The Washington, DC, metropolitan area has a number of features that dictate preferred 
locations of cordons. The public transportation system exists over the entire region but is 
concentrated in the downtown core. The Washington Metrorail system predominantly serves the 
area inside the Beltway. The economic activity in the region is centralized. Additionally, the 
transportation network developed in a way such that entry points to the cordon toll can be easily 
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identified by travelers and implemented by the city. Simulations consist of three cordons based 
on specific locations in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area that have been assessed as 
realistic for the implementation of such tolls (see Figure 2). 
The first cordon circumscribes the downtown core of Washington, DC, hereafter referred 
to as the Downtown cordon. It covers an area of approximately 4 square miles. This area is the 
heart of economic activity for the region. More than 400,000 trips are made daily to the 
Washington, DC, downtown core, with 83.6 percent for commuting purpose. In relative terms, 
this corresponds to 8.6 percent of all trips and 14.1 percent of all commuting trips made over the 
study area. A majority of these trips (52.5 percent) are made by public transit, mostly by rail. 
Among those, 154,000 car trips are made with destinations in the downtown core. With the 
transportation network consisting of local streets and few arterials, it results in high congestion. 
The location of the second cordon coincides with the Beltway; we will refer to this 
cordon as the Beltway cordon. The area encompassed by the cordon is approximately 170 square 
miles; an upper bound on the size of a tolled area as underlined by Safirova et al. (2005). This 
area is a mixture of residential sectors, working locations for both private business and for the 
public sector, and public areas, such as parks. The active population living within the Beltway 
was estimated at 1.16 million in 2000, which correspond to 28.1 percent of the active population 
of the entire study area. The metro system extends just beyond the Beltway and has park and ride 
facilities. Suburban light rail systems (MARC, VRE) also are available for travelers from more 
distant locations. Bus systems cover a large area and have fairly good frequency. There are 1.28 
million daily trips from outside to inside the Beltway. Unlike the Downtown core, the vast 
majority of trips from outside to inside the Beltway are made by cars (87.8 percent). A Beltway 
cordon toll will generate substantial revenue because of the large area it covers and the large 
number of trips. 
The third cordon toll policy is the combination of the Beltway and Downtown cordons, 
under which the two policies are implemented simultaneously. Travelers using their vehicle from 
outside the Beltway to the Washington, DC, downtown core will face two independent fees. We 
refer to this policy as the Double cordon. 
The fee is uniform for the three policies and only charged to vehicles accessing the 
cordon area during the morning peak period, which begins at 6:30 a.m. and lasts until 9:30 a.m. 
The toll revenue and the additional transit fare revenue collected under the cordon are 
redistributed lump sum to all individuals. The implementation costs of the cordon are not taken 
into account because even if they can be substantial for a large cordon, such as the one defined 
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by the Beltway, we are interested in the long-term effects of the policy. For each of the three 
policies, we found the toll level that brings optimal welfare gains. Comparisons between policies 
are conducted at these toll levels. 
Results 
Table 1 compares the overall results for the three policies. The total welfare gains are 
positive for the Beltway and Downtown cordons, as has been found in the earlier comparison 
using START only (2005). Therefore, accounting for the long-term economic and land use 
effects does not reverse the net effect of the policies. Note that although 2 dollars separates the 
optimal toll leves for the different cordons, the Beltway cordon provides welfare gains that are 
only 14 percent higher than the Downtown cordon ($104 million versus $91 million).  
Figure 3 shows that the welfare gains under the Beltway cordon are much more sensitive 
to toll levels. For the Downtown cordon, welfare gains have a greater robustness, particularly if 
the charge happens to be higher than the optimal.  
The optimal combination of the two cordons is a Beltway cordon of 218 cents with a 
Downtown cordon of 343 cents. At the optimum, the welfare gain is $150.9 million, 65.4 percent 
and 44.7 percent higher, respectively, than those from the Downtown and Beltway cordons 
(Table 1). Thus, the Double cordon yields a substantial improvement in efficiency.  
The sensitivity of the welfare gains under the larger cordon and their robustness under the 
smaller cordon is captured in the path to the optimal Double cordon. As shown on Figure 4, the 
optimal welfare gain is located at the highest point of a plateau that is circumscribed by a tight 
range of Beltway cordon charges and a wider range of Downtown cordon charges. 
Welfare Decomposition 
Table 2 presents the results of the welfare decomposition. The welfare per capita has 
been decomposed into several components representing effects of all transportation and 
economic variables that affect individuals. The welfare decomposition is reported for five large 
regions of the study area. The “Downtown core” region is defined as the region inside the 
Downtown cordon. The “Downtown” is the region at its exterior periphery. The “Close suburbs” 
is the region at the inside periphery of the Beltway. The “Distant suburbs” is the region tangent 
to the Beltway, but exterior to it. Finally, the “Exurbs” is the rest of the area. As we observe, the 
residents of the Downtown core gain the most across all three policies, followed by the residents 
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of the Exurbs. Residents living in the Downtown region and the Distant suburbs gain the least. 
The following analysis explains these results. 
Redistribution Scheme 
The Beltway cordon, by virtue of the large area it covers, is a policy that generates 
substantial toll revenue: almost $91 million annually. For the Downtown cordon, toll revenues 
are more modest: $21.1 million annually. On the other hand, this small cordon collects $45.8 
million annually in additional transit fares; almost three times the amount for the larger cordon. 
This difference lies in the significant substitution toward public transportation that a small 
cordon induces. Unsurprisingly, the Double cordon is the policy that collects the most toll 
revenue: $110.9 million annually. The lower toll in the downtown induces a smaller substitution 
toward public transit. The amount of additional transit fares collected under the Double cordon is 
between the two other policies: $28 million annually.  
In Table 2, the term “Toll Revenue” reflects the size of the welfare gains due solely to the 
lump-sum redistribution, in the form of extra unearned income, of the toll revenue and additional 
transit fares collected. The toll redistribution brought important welfare gains; residents of all 
five regions benefit similarly from the redistribution.  
Transportation Effects 
As shown in Figure 5, the residents living near the exterior periphery of the cordons face 
the highest increase in their costs of travel. The number of economically active residents living 
just outside of the Downtown cordon is 486,000 and 1.2 million live immediately outside the 
Beltway. Therefore, a significantly larger number of individuals suffer from the travel cost 
increase induced by the larger cordon. On the other hand, residents inside the cordon see a 
decrease, or in the case of the Beltway, a very low increase, in travel costs. For these latter 
residents, the reduction in congestion brought by the cordons induces time savings, resulting in 
lower costs of travel relative to the baseline.  
In Table 2, we observe that these changes in travel costs have important implications for 
the welfare gains within the regions. An important effect is that the changes in travel costs 
adversely affect all commuters, especially those residing just outside the cordons. The Beltway 
cordon impacts these commuters particularly negatively. This result might appear 
counterintuitive, since the toll level is lower than for the Downtown cordon. However, this result 
makes sense because the commuters around the Beltway rely more on cars as a mode of 
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transportation and travelers have fewer opportunities to find new routes to avoid the toll given its 
large area. 
As for the costs of shopping trips, the effects on the welfare gains are less clear. For the 
residents living in the Downtown core, the changes in the costs of shopping bring significant 
welfare gains. The fact that shopping trips occur mainly during the off-peak and evening peak 
period means that shoppers living in the Downtown core are simultaneously less burdened by the 
toll and gaining from the relief of congestion. Interestingly, the changes in costs of shopping 
trips induce the larger welfare losses for the individuals living just inside the Beltway cordon. 
Economic and Land-Use Effects 
Changes in rents, wages, prices, and real estate values are the explicit long-term 
economic and land use effects of the cordon policy that influence the welfare gains. These 
variables have a significant impact when we assess their contribution to the welfare gains (Table 
2). While changes in real estate value and wages contribute to welfare gains, changes in the 
prices of retail goods and in residential rents lead to welfare losses. 
Rents. Regarding the changes in residential patterns, the zones at the exterior periphery of 
the cordons (Distant suburbs) see a decrease of their active population. Migrants are moving 
inside the cordon and to a lesser extent into the Exurbs. Under the Beltway cordon, migrants 
prefer to reallocate to the very core of the cordon rather than to the interior periphery of the 
cordon (Close suburbs). This behavior is exacerbated under the Double cordon. As a result, 
changes in residential patterns create upward pressure on the residential rents in the Downtown 
core. Under the three policies, they increase by 0.23 percent, 0.30 percent, and 0.39 percent for 
the Beltway, Downtown, and Double cordons, respectively. These higher rents lead to welfare 
losses. On the other hand, residents of the Distant suburbs, whose population is declining, benefit 
from lower rents. 
Wages. The degree of change in work status and location are reflected by the variations in 
average gross wage rates (Figure 6). Wages increase in all zones and especially inside the 
cordons. The Double cordon affects the labor market the most, followed by the Beltway cordon. 
These increases are induced by a labor scarcity that comes from both unemployment and 
relocation of the workers to certain zones. In this competitive characterization of the economy, 
the reduction of the labor supply in a given zone increases the marginal productivity of labor, 
which corresponds to higher wages. These changes in work status and location are primarily 
caused by the higher costs of commuting. The lump-sum redistribution of the toll revenue also 
leads to higher unemployment because it reduces the opportunity cost of unemployment. As a 
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result, we observe in Table 2 that the higher wages are an important contributor to the welfare 
gains, predominantly where labor becomes scarcer.  
It should be noted that the welfare gains brought by higher wages partially are 
outweighed by the shift toward unemployment. Eventually for very high tolls the welfares losses 
caused by unemployment will dominate. This reversal between the two effects partly explains 
why the Beltway cordon is more sensitive to toll levels. The Beltway cordon affects a greater 
share of the active population; therefore, changes in toll levels induce a shift toward 
unemployment that eventually dominates. 
Prices. The response of producers to the cordon policies is another factor affecting the 
welfare gains. More specifically, the response of producers is channeled to the welfare gains by 
the changes in the prices of retail goods and services they induce. These prices are a function of 
the demand of the shoppers and the costs of production. In the present simulations, the increases 
in wages impose enough pressure on the costs of production to result in higher retail prices. This 
inflationary pressure leads to welfare losses for individuals, as shown on Table 2. It is 
particularly true in the region inside the cordons, where the price increases are the highest. Note 
that individuals are more negatively affected by the changes in prices under a Beltway cordon 
relative to a Downtown cordon. This is another reason why the welfare gains under a Beltway 
cordon are more sensitive to the toll level.  
The three policies increase the regional GDP over the whole study area. Overall, the 
Double cordon induces a $420.9 million increase, the Beltway cordon induces a $300.1 million 
increase, and the Downtown cordon induces a $247.7 million increase. In Figure 7, we observe 
that under a Beltway or Double cordon, the GDP decreases the most around the interior 
periphery of the cordon and increases in the exurbs and to a lesser extent in the Downtown area. 
Under the Downtown cordon, the GDP is reduced more at the exterior periphery of the cordon. 
Thus, the smaller cordon adversely affects production in the area outside the cordon but it is no 
longer true as the size of the cordon increases 
Real Estate Values. A shift in residence pattern and production results in higher rents on 
average over the whole study area (Double cordon: 0.058 percent, Beltway cordon: 0.042 percent 
and Downtown cordon: 0.033 percent). In turn, the higher rents increase the value of the 
buildings (housing, commercial, and industrial) provided by the developers. For individuals, who 
own a share of the real estate, the appreciation of real estate values translates into additional 
unearned income. 
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Conclusions 
In this paper, we have used an integrated model of land use, transportation, and economic 
activity (LUSTRE) to simulate the long-term effects of three cordon-based congestion pricing 
policies. Three policies have been modeled: a small Downtown cordon, a large Beltway cordon, 
and a Double cordon, combining the two other cordons. For each policy, we find the cordon 
level that maximizes residents’ welfare and compare policies at the optimum toll level.  
We find that all three policies result in modest but positive welfare gains, with the Double 
cordon being most effective. At the optimum, the welfare gain from the Double cordon amounts 
to $150.9 million annually, 65.4 percent and 44.7 percent higher than those from the Downtown 
and Beltway cordons, respectively. 
However, the welfare gains from the downtown toll are relatively insensitive to the 
charge level, while the gains from the other two policies decline sharply with deviation from the 
optimum. Therefore, even though the expected gains from the smaller cordon are lower, in 
practice smaller cordons are likely a safer bet. If the toll levels are set suboptimally, the tolling 
schemes with larger cordons might result in welfare gains significantly inferior to the optimal 
ones, but the small cordon will still be effective. 
 
12 Resources for the Future  Safirova et al. 
References 
Akiyama, T., S. Mun, and M. Okushima. 2002. Second-Best Congestion Pricing in Urban Space: 
Cordon Pricing and its Alternatives. The Review of Network Economics 3(4): 401–414. 
Anas, A., and R. Xu. 1999. Congestion, Land Use and Job Dispersion: A General Equilibrium 
Model. Journal of Urban Economics 45: 451–473. 
Lindsey, R., and E. T. Verhoef. 2001. Traffic congestion and congestion pricing. In Handbook of 
Transport Systems and Traffic Control,  edited by K. J. Button and D. A. Henser. Oxford: 
Elsevier Science, 77–105. 
May, A. D., R. Liu, S. P. Shepherd, and A. Sumalee. 2002. The Impact of Cordon Design on the 
Performance of Road Pricing Schemes. Transport Policy 9: 209–220. 
May, A. D., M. Roberts, and P. Mason. 1992. The Development of Transport Strategies for 
Edinburgh. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers: Transportation 95: 51–59. 
Mun, S., K. Konishi, and K. Yoshikawa. 2003. Optimal Cordon Pricing. Journal of Urban 
Economics 54: 21–38. 
Pigou, A C. 1920. Wealth and Welfare. London: Macmillan. 
Safirova, E., K. Gillingham, W. Harrington, P. Nelson, and D. Lipman. 2005. Choosing 
Congestion Pricing Policy: Cordon Tolls vs. Link-Based Tolls. Transportation Research 
Record 1932:169–177. 
Safirova, E., S. Houde, D. Lipman, W. Harrington, and A. Baglino. 2006. Congestion Pricing: 
Long-Term Economic and Land use Effects. Discussion paper 06-37. Washington, DC: 
Resources for the Future.  
Santos, G. 2004. Urban Congestion Charging: A Second-Best Alternative. Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy 38(3): 345–369. 
Santos, G., and B. Shaffer. 2004. Preliminary Results of the London Congestion Charging 
Scheme. Public Works, Management and Policy 9(2): 164–181. 
Shepherd, S. P., and A. Sumalee. 2004. A Genetic Algorithm Based Approach to Optimal Toll 
Level and Location Problems. Networks and Spatial Economics 4(2): 161–179. 
Small, K. A., and J. A. Gómez-Ibáñez. 1998. Road Pricing for Congestion Management: The 
transition from theory to policy. In Road Pricing, Traffic Congestion and the 
13 Resources for the Future  Safirova et al. 
Environment: Issue of Efficiency and Social Feasibility, edited by K. J. Button and E. T.  
Verhoef. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 213–246.
Transportation Research Board. 2003. Road Value Pricing: Travelers Response to Transport 
System Changes. Transit Cooperative Research Program Report 95. Washington, DC: 
Transportation Research Board. 
Verhoef, E. T. 2002. Second-Best Congestion Charging in General Networks. Heuristic 
Algorithms of Finding Second-Best Optimal Toll Levels and Toll Point. Transportation 
Research B 36: 707–729.  
 Vickerman, R. 2005. Evaluating the Wider Economic Impacts of Congestion Charging 
Schemes: the Limitations of Conventional Modeling Approaches. Paper presented at the 
45
th ERSA Congress, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, August 2005.  
Zhang, X., and H. Yang. The Optimal Cordon-Based Network Congestion Pricing Problem. 







14 Resources for the Future  Safirova et al. 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Welfare Gains and Revenue Collected under Three Cordon Policies  











Beltway Cordon  277  104273  90967  16411 
Downtown Cordon  470  91217  21131  45812 
Double Cordon 
Beltway:   218 
Downtown: 343 
150850 110932 28025 
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Table 2. Decomposition of LUSTRE’s Welfare for Three Cordon Policies 
Welfare Decomposition (2000$/year)    Welfare 
Gains     









Price Rent  Commuting 





Term          
Downtown 
core  50.0  37.9 51.6 10.9  -23.9  -15.9  -1.2  17.5  -27.0 
Downtown  
42.4  39.0  52.2  11.0  -26.0  -13.5  -1.3  -5.9  -13.1 
Close 
Suburbs  36.0  41.8 48.8 10.3  -26.4  -9.0  -7.3  -18.6  -3.7 
Distant 
Suburbs  34.5  36.9  49.0  10.3  -17.0  6.1  -45.2  -5.1  -0.6 
Exurbs 
43.4 24.6  44.5  9.4  -13.7  -3.8  -11.8  -0.49  -5.3 
Beltway  
Cordon     
277 cents  
All Area 
39.6  32.8  47.5  10.0  -18.1  -2.9  -19.9  -4.9  -4.9 
Downtown 
core  53.7 37.3  32.2  8.3  -18.8  -21.4  -1.8  54.6  -36.6 
Downtown 
27.7  31.1  32.5  8.4  -15.3  3.9  -28.1  -8.2  3.4 
Close 
Suburbs  28.7 26.1  30.4  7.8  -12.3  1.3  -21.0  -0.45  -3.1 
Distant 
Suburbs  31.6  26.9  30.6  7.9  -13.7  -3.1  -11.3  0.32  -5.9 
Exurbs 
33.7 20.6  27.2  7.1  -12.1  -3.6  -3.0  0.07  -3.2 
Downtown 
Cordon    
470 cents  
All Area 
31.9  24.8  29.6  7.6  -13.1  -2.1  -11.0  -0.06  -3.8 
Downtown 
core  80.8  57.0 66.8 14.8  -32.8  -27.9  -2.2  49.6  -44.5 
Downtown 
53.6  53.9  67.5  14.9  -32.1  -6.3  -24.2  -13.3  -6.5 
Close 
Suburbs  49.3  53.0 63.1 13.9  -30.5  -5.0  -23.9  -17.0  -4.3 
Distant 
Suburbs  51.4  49.6  63.4  14.0  -23.8  1.9  -43.9  -4.3  -5.6 
Exurbs 
60.2  35.2 57.6 12.7  -20.0  -6.1  -11.4  -0.43  -7.2 
Double 
Cordon: 
Beltway     
218 cents, 
Downtown    
343 cents  
All Area 
55.5  44.7  61.5  13.6  -24.3  -3.9  -24.5  -4.8  -6.8 
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Figure 1. Flow Diagram of LUSTRE 
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Figure 2. Policy Description 
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Figure 4. Total Welfare Gains under a Double Cordon 
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Figure 5. Changes in Travel Costs by Zones of Origin for Three Cordon Policies, 
Simulation vs. Baseline 
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Figure 6. Changes in Average Gross Wages Rates for Three Cordon Policies, Simulation 
vs. Baseline 
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Figure 7. Changes in Regional GDP for Three Cordon Policies, Simulation vs. Baseline 
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